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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith,1 a Free Exercise Clause
case that radically shifted religious exercise jurisprudence in America.
Prior to Smith, the Court applied the compelling interest test to all
Free Exercise claims, requiring courts to apply strict scrutiny to any
undue burden placed on free exercise.2 But the Court deviated from
this standard when it held that neutral and generally applicable laws
do not trigger Free Exercise Clause protections.3 As a result, plaintiffs
began shifting their attention to states’ religion provisions in an effort
to seek greater protections under state constitutions.
Article 1 section 4 of the Nebraska constitution (the Conscience
Clause)4 secures the rights of conscience for Nebraska citizens.5 How-
ever, while many states have chosen to apply a high level of constitu-
tional scrutiny to their state constitutions’ conscience clauses, the
Nebraska Supreme Court chose to do the opposite—instead applying
the federal Constitution’s Smith standard to Nebraska’s Conscience
Clause.6 In doing so, the court declined to examine the textual and
historical differences between the state provision and its federal
counterpart.7
More than a decade has passed since the Nebraska Supreme Court
last addressed the purpose and meaning of its state constitution’s
Conscience Clause. This Comment examines the Nebraska Supreme
Court’s erroneous application of the Smith standard to Nebraska’s
Conscience Clause and the need for the court to readdress and appro-
priately analyze the provision’s meaning and purpose. Part II exam-
ines the text of the Free Exercise Clause and its meaning, Nebraska’s
Conscience Clause, and the proper understanding of “conscience.”
Part II also tracks the history of federal and Nebraska religious exer-
cise jurisprudence—including the Free Exercise Clause standards
1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4
(2012); infra text accompanying note 58. As discussed infra text accompanying
note 61, the statute which superseded Smith is not applicable to the states, in-
cluding Nebraska or its state constitution.
2. See infra text accompanying note 54.
3. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885–90.
4. See In re Interest of Anaya, 276 Neb. 825, 758 N.W.2d 10 (2008).
5. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“All persons have a natural and indefeasible right to
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences. . . . [N]or
shall any interference with the rights of conscience be permitted.” (emphasis
added)).
6. See Anaya, 276 Neb. at 833, 758 N.W.2d at 18 (declining “to review their state
constitutional challenge under a higher degree of scrutiny than challenges under
the Free Exercise Clause of the federal Constitution”). Other states’ interpreta-
tions of their state constitutions’ conscience provisions will be discussed infra sec-
tion II.D.
7. Anaya, 276 Neb. at 834, 758 N.W.2d at 18.
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that have changed over time—while focusing on the Smith standard,
Nebraska’s application of this standard, and other states’ responses to
shifting standards in federal jurisprudence.
Part III argues that the Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision to ap-
ply the Smith standard to its Conscience Clause was incorrect in two
aspects. First, the court failed to properly interpret the Conscience
Clause—ignoring its own rules of construction which call for an inde-
pendent analysis of the provision’s text to determine its original
meaning. Second, the court engaged in judicial overreach when it ap-
plied the meaning of a federal provision to its textually distinct state
provision. This overreach undermined the State’s autonomous right to
interpret its unique state constitution independently from the federal
Constitution. Summarily, the Nebraska Supreme Court errantly
stripped conscience rights protections from the Nebraska Conscience
Clause over ten years ago. It is time for the court to readdress the
clause’s language, return the Conscience Clause to its original mean-
ing, and restore religious liberty protections in Nebraska.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Free Exercise Clause: What It Means and
What It Protects
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment states, “Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”8 The text of the Free Exercise
Clause does not define religious exercise in detail,9 but the federal
provision is more clearly understood when viewed in light of its gen-
eral intent and structure.
First, the language as a whole was intended to establish the frame-
work for permissible government action affecting the enumerated
right of free exercise at both the state and federal level.10 Rather than
defining free exercise in detail, the framers used broad, umbrella-like
language. This was the U.S. Constitution’s framers’ intention.11 By
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. JOHN WITTE JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 89
(2005).
10. See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 18 (2009)
(“[S]tate constitutions are constrained by, and constitute integral parts of, the
federal Constitution.”); see also Louis D. Bilionis, On the Significance of Constitu-
tional Spirit, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1803, 1805 (1992) (“Federal and state constitutions
thus are interdependent features of a greater American constitutional structure
. . . .”); JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 184
(2006) (“[T]he drafting of the federal Bill of Rights . . . was concerned with defin-
ing civil rights and liberties and ensuring their protection against governmental
action.”).
11. John Witte Jr., Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Consti-
tutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 395 (1999) (“[T]he phrase [free
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using the term “free exercise,” these framers sought to encapsulate
various forms of religious exercise in one phrase.12
Second, the Free Exercise Clause forbids Congress from prohibit-
ing free exercise. Early drafts of the Free Exercise Clause included
alternative words like “infringe,” “compel,” and “violate,” yet these
words were replaced with the single word, “prohibit.”13 This prohibi-
tion is a direct restraint on Congress. Congress, as part of the new
federal government,14 lacked constitutional authority to enact laws
forbidding individuals from exercising their religion.15 The framers of
the Free Exercise Clause included this restraint on Congress because
of their belief that a person’s religious exercise should be outside the
scope of the federal government’s power.16 Because religious convic-
tions were believed to take “precedent[,] both in order of time and in
degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society,”17 the Constitu-
tion’s framers wanted to ensure that individuals were not compelled to
choose “between obedience to religious duties and obedience to civil
laws.”18
Third, and most notably, the Free Exercise Clause does not include
a conscience provision.19 States proposed various drafts for what be-
came the Free Exercise Clause, many of which included reference to
exercise] generally connoted various forms of free public religious action—relig-
ious speech, religious worship, religious assembly, religious publication, religious
education, among others.”).
12. See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Participation in Public Programs: Religious
Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 174–75 (1992) (“The Free Exer-
cise Clause . . . does protect the freedom to act in accordance with the dictates of
religion, as the believer understands them.”).
13. See 1 ANNALS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 434–35, 730 (Joseph Gales
ed., 1834), reprinted in Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of
Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1580, 1606 n.202 (1989) [hereinafter
ANNALS OF CONG.]; see also WITTE JR., supra note 9, at 79–88 (reprinting the lan-
guage of the twenty proposed drafts of the Free Exercise Clause prior to its ratifi-
cation). Draft nine of the Free Exercise Clause read in part: “[N]o state shall
infringe the equal rights of conscience.” Id. Draft fourteen stated in part: “Con-
gress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the
rights of conscience be infringed.” Id.
14. WITTE JR., supra note 9, at 91.
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“[N]or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” (em-
phasis added)).
16. McConnell, supra note 12, at 173. Professor McConnell also discusses the rela-
tionship between modern First Amendment jurisprudence and how the Free Ex-
ercise Clause and Establishment Clause interact in the midst of it, which is
outside the scope of this Comment. See generally id.
17. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESS-
MENTS (1785), reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 64 (1947).
18. Sara Lunsford Kohen, Note, The Erosion of Nebraska’s Free Exercise Protection:
In re Interest of Anaya (Anaya II), 276 Neb. 825, 758 N.W.2d 10 (2008), 89 NEB.
L. REV. 159, 175 (2010).
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
894 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:890
rights of conscience.20 This conscience language was incorporated in a
proposed draft of what became the Free Exercise Clause, stating in
part, “nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any man-
ner, or on any pretext, infringed.”21 This conscience language propo-
sal, along with nineteen other drafts, was rejected from the ultimate
language of the Free Exercise Clause.22
B. Nebraska’s Conscience Clause Language
In contrast to the drafters of the federal Constitution, Nebraska’s
framers included a right of conscience provision in their state constitu-
tion.23 Article 1 section 4 of the Nebraska constitution states in perti-
nent part, “All persons have a natural and indefeasible right to
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own con-
sciences. . . . [N]or shall any interference with the rights of conscience
be permitted.”24
The Conscience Clause’s explicit protection of the natural rights of
conscience is distinctly different from the First Amendment’s Free Ex-
ercise Clause. The term “conscience” dates back over two millennia,
originating in Roman and biblical times.25 References to conscience
can be found in canonical, common, and civil law.26 Further, before
the federal Constitution’s framers referenced conscience in Free Exer-
cise Clause drafts, early colonies recognized the rights of conscience in
their state constitutions.27 This conscience right, as understood by the
20. See supra text accompanying note 13.
21. Id.
22. WITTE JR., supra note 9, at 51. For a discussion on drafting proposals and lan-
guage, see id. at 76–105; Adams & Emmerich, supra note 13, at 1559–1671 (con-
sidering the effect that the proposed drafts had on the First Congress).
23. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4.
24. Id. As discussed infra Part III, this freedom of conscience language was included
in the 1866 constitutional proposal and has remained almost untouched since,
withstanding major changes made to the State’s constitution in the three consti-
tutional conventions following the convention in 1866. KATE GAUL, LEGISLATIVE
RESEARCH OFFICE, THE NEBRASKA CONSTITUTION: 1866–2016 (Feb. 2017), http://
nebraskalegislature.gov/pdf/reports/research/constitution2017.pdf [https://perma
.unl.edu/Z4BA-SEDZ].
25. WITTE JR., supra note 9, at 41. See generally 1 Timothy 1:5 (New American Stan-
dard Bible) (“But the goal of our instruction is love from a pure heart and a good
conscience and a sincere faith.”); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Histori-
cal Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
26. WITTE JR., supra note 9, at 41.
27. See, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1776, art. II (stating in part “[t]hat all men have a natural
and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their
own consciences and understanding . . . .”); VA. CONST. of 1776, § 16 (“[R]eligion,
or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be
directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore all
men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates
of conscience . . . .”); see also N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX (“[A]ll men have a
natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates
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early states, is rooted in natural law.28 Under Natural Law Theory,
the “natural and indefeasible” right of conscience in the Conscience
Clause is a right naturally possessed by every human being.29 Natural
rights are not granted by government; rather, they are inherently pos-
sessed by every human being, regardless of whether the government
chooses to recognize them.30
Nearly a century after the earliest states declared conscience as a
natural right, Nebraskans included this affirmation in their Con-
science Clause.31 Nebraska’s constitution as a whole,32 and specifi-
cally its Conscience Clause, reflects this principle that freedom of
conscience is a natural and indefeasible right—a right that precedes
enumeration in the Conscience Clause.33 The drafters of the Con-
science Clause thus recognized that the right of conscience is not sub-
ject to the control of any human government.34 The Conscience
Clause’s use of the term “indefeasible” reinforces its derivation from
natural law. The term is synonymous with how early political philoso-
phers defined conscience as an “inalienable right”—an inherent right
of their own consciences”); N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XVIII (“[N]o person shall ever
. . . be deprived of the inestimable privilege of worshipping Almighty God in a
manner, agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience . . . .”).
28. Christopher Hammons, State Constitutions, Religious Protection, and Federal-
ism, 7 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 226, 232 (2013).
29. See MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN & LUKE PAULSEN, THE CONSTITUTION: AN INTRO-
DUCTION 99 (2015) (stating religious exercise is “an inalienable ‘natural right’
that preceded the Constitution and the social compact, a sphere that no mere
human authority could properly invade”).
30. See Hammons, supra note 28.
31. This belief continued through to the 1919–1920 Nebraska Constitutional Conven-
tion. A typical prayer that opened the convention on a daily basis stated that the
people of Nebraska were thankful to God “for the Pilgrims and the Puritans who
came . . . [and] for the principle that all men should be allowed to worship God
according to the dictates of their own conscience . . . .” See PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1919–1920 VOL. 1, at 892 (Clyde H. Barnard ed.,
1920).
32. Nebraska’s Preamble further reveals that the Nebraska constitution reflects
principles of the natural law. NEB. CONST. pmbl. (“We, the people, grateful to
Almighty God for our freedom . . . .”). This indicates the Conscience Clause was
written under the assumption that God plays a role in Nebraskans’ freedoms that
are protected and recognized by their government because a preamble sheds light
on the philosophy of its framers and the people of the state at the time. See Ham-
mons, supra note 28, at 229.
33. See supra text accompanying note 29.
34. PAULSEN & PAULSEN, supra note 29, at 99–100; see also Hammons, supra note 28,
at 232–33 (stating that government cannot prohibit individuals from exercising
their religion, a right every person inherently possesses).
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that cannot be taken away by the government.35 This freedom is ex-
pressly protected by the language of the Conscience Clause.36
Additionally, the affirmative nature of the Conscience Clause’s ina-
lienable right of conscience is distinct from the federal Free Exercise
Clause. The Conscience Clause’s language is phrased like many state
constitutions’ religion clauses: as a declaration of an “affirmative”
right held by the people with an accompanying limitation on the gov-
ernment’s power to infringe that right—rather than a “negative” right
expressed solely as a limitation on Congress.37 In other words, the
Conscience Clause affirms that all persons possess this right and pre-
vents government interference,38 instead of merely prohibiting a gov-
ernmental action.39
C. Early States’ References to Conscience
Early states’ understandings of the liberty of conscience also pro-
vide insight into the meaning of the conscience rights in Nebraska’s
constitution. Nebraska’s current Conscience Clause language was
originally adopted in 1875,40 but references to rights of conscience in
America date back to the earliest settlers.41 Every state constitution
35. See, e.g., MADISON, supra note 17 (stating that freedom of religion is “in its nature
an unalienable right” because it is “a duty towards the Creator,” and every man
has a duty to God defined by conscience that is “precedent[,] both in order of time
and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society”).
36. Nebraska Constitutional Convention delegates believed that not only was free-
dom of religion a natural right, but that it is the role of government to protect
these rights for the good of the people. One delegate in 1871, four years prior to
the Nebraska constitution’s ratification, stated:
We all have natural inherent rights that the government can not deprive
us of; that cannot be taken away from us, but exercise of these rights, for
the good of the governed are regulated by law, and it is doing injustice to
the government to say that it undertakes to destroy these rights. . . . I
am not afraid sir, of the millions and billions in the east leaving their
home across the ocean and coming here to enjoy those rights.
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE NEBRASKA CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION ASSEMBLED IN LINCOLN, JUNE THIRTEENTH, 1871 212 (Addi-
son Sheldon ed., 1905) [hereinafter OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE 1871 DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS].
37. See Jeremy Patrick, The Religion Provisions of the Nebraska Constitution: An
Analysis and Litigation History, 19 J.L. & RELIGION 331, 357 (2003).
38. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“[N]or shall any interference with the rights of con-
science be permitted.” (emphasis added)).
39. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
40. Compare NEB. CONST. of 1875, art. I, § 4, with NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4.
41. See Michael W. McConnell, Freedom from Persecution or Protection of the Rights
of Conscience?: A Critique of Justice Scalia’s Historical Arguments in City of
Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 819, 830 (1998) (stating in regards to
the states that existed prior to the Free Exercise Clause that “[a]lthough the pre-
cise language of these state provisions varied, almost all of them had a common
structure: a broad guarantee of free exercise or liberty of conscience”).
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that preceded the federal Constitution included conscience language
in the context of religious exercise.42 The colony of Virginia was the
first to adopt dictates of conscience language in a legally binding docu-
ment.43 The underlying purpose of Virginia’s Declaration of Rights in
177644 was to proclaim that “rulers can have authority over such nat-
ural rights, only as we have submitted to them. The rights of con-
science we never submitted, we could not submit.”45 The Vermont
Constitution of 1793 is another example. Vermont’s provision was
similar to Nebraska’s Conscience Clause, stating “[t]hat all men have
a natural and inalienable right, to worship Almighty God, according to
the dictates of their own consciences and understandings.”46
Further, states continued to enshrine rights of conscience in their
constitutions following the ratification of the federal Constitution.
These states chose to include more specific guarantees of religious lib-
erty and freedom of conscience than the earlier-ratified Free Exercise
Clause, as discussed next.47
D. Federal Free Exercise Jurisprudence
During Nebraska’s early years as a state, the Conscience Clause
was the only applicable provision that regulated the state’s involve-
ment in its citizens’ religious exercise rights.48 States were not bound
by the federal Free Exercise Clause until 1940 when the Free Exercise
Clause was incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.49 Prior to this incorporation, forty-two of the forty-eight
state constitutions—most of which were enacted after the Free Exer-
cise Clause was ratified—contained a clause protecting the right of
conscience. That these states chose to explicitly protect the right of
42. WITTE JR., supra note 9, at 44 (“All the early state constitutions included a guar-
antee of liberty of conscience for all.”).
43. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 13, at 1569 (“The Virginia Declaration of Rights,
drafted principally by George Mason, guaranteed the free exercise of religion and
served as a model for other state charters.”).
44. See VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776. The pertinent language states in part
that religion “can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or vio-
lence; and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion,
according to the dictates of conscience . . . .” Id.
45. LOUIS FISHER, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA: POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS 40 (2002)
(emphasis added) (citing 3 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 263 (Paul Leicester
Ford ed., 1904)).
46. VT. CONST. of 1793, art. III.
47. See supra text accompanying note 27.
48. After its ratification, the Due Process Clause incorporated certain constitutional
provisions to apply to the states through individual cases brought before the
Court. One such case is Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), which in-
corporated the Free Exercise Clause to apply against the states. For a critique of
the incorporation of the Free Exercise Clause against the states, see Ira C. Lupu
& Robert W. Tuttle, Federalism and Faith, 56 EMORY L.J. 19 (2006).
49. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 48.
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conscience, rather than mere free exercise, is significant because it ev-
idences the decision of later states not to bind their religious exercise
provisions to the federal Free Exercise Clause.50 Rather, these states
expressed the meaning and purpose of religious freedom separately
from the federal provision.51
In the 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court began establishing strong
protection for Free Exercise claims pursuant to the incorporation of
the First Amendment against the states. Following Sherbert v. Ver-
ner,52 any law that allegedly violated the Free Exercise Clause was
required to meet strict scrutiny, or the “compelling interest test,” to
remain valid.53 For the law to be upheld under this standard, the Gov-
ernment must prove it has a compelling interest to unduly burden free
exercise, and the law imposing the burden must be the least restric-
tive means of achieving that compelling interest.54 This standard ap-
plied to all Free Exercise Clause claims, even if the challenged law
was neutral on its face, i.e., did not explicitly prohibit free exercise.55
Universal application of strict scrutiny to Free Exercise claims
shifted dramatically in 1990 when the U.S. Supreme Court decided
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith.56
Rather than applying strict scrutiny to all Free Exercise claims, the
50. See Stuart G. Parsell, Note, Revitalization of the Free Exercise of Religion Under
State Constitutions: A Response to Employment Division v. Smith, 68 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 747, 773 (1993) (“Subsequent to Smith, however, differences be-
tween the religious protections under state constitutions and those afforded
under the First Amendment are beginning to appear for the first time.”).
51. WITTE JR., supra note 9, at 109.
52. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
53. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. The Court in
Yoder also held that interference with the free exercise of a sincerely held relig-
ious belief must be justified by a compelling state interest. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214.
54. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. The Government in Sher-
bert ultimately failed to meet strict scrutiny. The Court in Sherbert also rejected
a belief/conduct distinction regarding religious exercise. The Court concluded
that both belief and conduct are protected under the Free Exercise Clause, hold-
ing that disqualification from benefits for refusal to work on Saturdays due to
religious convictions was unconstitutional. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410. The Court
in Smith affirms this. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
877 (1990) (“[T]he ‘exercise of religion’ often involves not only belief and profes-
sion but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts . . . .”). A more in-
depth discussion of the belief/conduct distinction is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. For further analysis, see generally Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct
Paradigm in the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Jurisprudence: A Theological Ac-
count of the Failure to Protect Religious Conduct, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 713 (1993).
55. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220 (“A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application,
nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if
it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.”).
56. 494 U.S. 872. In Smith, Native American claimants asserted their sincerely held
religious beliefs and conduct were violated under the government’s prohibition on
the use of peyote, a hallucinogenic that the Native Americans ingested during
religious ceremonies. Id. at 874.
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Court held that a different standard applied to certain claims.57
Under the new test in Smith, if a law is (1) neutral and (2) generally
applicable, any alleged burden placed on religious exercise by the law
has no remedy under the Free Exercise Clause as long as the Govern-
ment provides a rational basis for the law.58 Thus, if the Government
is able to provide any rational basis for the law, the law will be up-
held—regardless of the burden placed on religious exercise. In other
words, under Smith, the “government may prohibit what religion re-
quires or require what religion prohibits so long as it acts through
neutral laws of general application.”59
In response to Smith and its departure from the compelling inter-
est test for all undue burdens placed on religious exercise, Congress
unanimously passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to
provide Americans with greater religious exercise protection than the
First Amendment provides under Smith.60 The Act, currently binding
on the federal government,61 intended to codify pre-Smith federal
Free Exercise case law, re-establish strict scrutiny and abrogate
Smith.62 In other words, RFRA sought to re-establish the demanding
57. Id. at 878.
58. Id. The rational basis test requires the lowest level of scrutiny by courts. The
government only needs to prove any conceivable basis for the law, thus requiring
the challenger of the law to disprove “every conceivable basis” for the law’s imple-
mentation. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1993). For a critique of the ra-
tional basis test, see generally Aaron Belzer, Putting the “Review” Back in
Rational Basis Review, 41 W. ST. U. L. REV. 339 (2014).
59. Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith,
Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850,
883 (2001) (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79). The Court ultimately held that the
law at issue in Smith prohibiting use of peyote was neutral and generally applica-
ble; thus, the claimants had no Free Exercise Clause claim. Smith, 494 U.S. at
874 (“[A]lthough it is constitutionally permissible to exempt sacramental peyote
use from the operation of drug laws, it is not constitutionally required.”).
60. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012).
61. In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the U.S. Supreme Court held
RFRA unconstitutional only as applied to the states. RFRA remains constitu-
tional as applied to the federal government, and the Court has affirmed RFRA as
applied to federal law. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751 (2014). Thus, RFRA does not apply to Nebraska’s Conscience Clause. Other
states, in response to Flores, have enacted their own state versions of RFRA to
restore and maintain stronger state protection of religious exercise. See Christo-
pher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D.
L. REV. 466, 477 n.67 (2010) (listing sixteen states that have enacted heightened
or strict scrutiny standards for their state religion provisions).
62. § 2000bb (stating its purpose is “to restore the compelling interest test as set
forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened”).
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standard of strict scrutiny for all laws—including neutral ones—that
placed an undue burden on religion.63
In addition, despite a historical lack of state religion clause juris-
prudence,64 states reacted to Smith by developing independent inter-
pretations of their state constitutions’ conscience provisions—the
majority opting to reject the Smith standard, recognizing greater pro-
tection for their citizens than the Smith standard affords.65 States
predominantly achieved this by applying the compelling interest test
to laws that impose an undue burden on the rights of conscience—i.e.,
by requiring strict scrutiny rather than the rational basis test re-
quired by Smith.66 Other states, like Nebraska, did not develop inde-
pendent state jurisprudence; instead, they adopted the Smith
standard and applied a lower level of scrutiny to their state religion
clauses.67
E. Current Conscience Rights Protection in Nebraska
Historically, claimants in Nebraska brought their claims under the
federal Free Exercise Clause—not the Nebraska Conscience Clause—
if their religious exercise was unduly burdened by the government.68
63. Id. (“[L]aws ‘neutral’ toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as
laws intended to interfere with religious exercise.”).
64. Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An
Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REV. 275, 298 (1993). For de-
cades prior to Smith, there was almost no developing state religion clause juris-
prudence. Authors noted that applications of state constitutions’ religion
provisions would have been “largely redundant” during this time in light of the
strict scrutiny standard that applied to Free Exercise Clause claims under Sher-
bert and Yoder, when “a separate state constitutional jurisprudence in free exer-
cise was unnecessary.” Id. at 298–99.
65. See Michael D. Currie, Note, Scrutiny Mutiny: Why the Iowa Supreme Court
Should Reject Employment Division v. Smith and Adopt a Strict Scrutiny Stan-
dard for Free-Exercise Claims Arising Under the Iowa Constitution, 99 IOWA L.
REV. 1363, 1377–78 nn.89–90 (2014) (“Twelve state supreme courts have rejected
Smith and adopted a greater standard of scrutiny. . . . The remaining four states
have adopted a heightened scrutiny standard.”) (citations omitted); Russell M.
Nigro, The Importance of Interpretative Theory in State Constitutional Law, 73
TEMP. L. REV. 905, 910 (2000) (“Particularly in the last twenty-five years, state
constitutional attention has been focused on the more expansive rights that a
state may provide through its interpretation of its constitution.”). For an in-depth
discussion on the functional aspects of this attention shift to state constitutional
provisions, see generally James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resis-
tance to National Power: Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91
GEO. L.J. 1003, 1031 (2003).
66. See Currie, supra note 65 at 1378 n.90
67. Id. at 1377 n.89 (citations omitted) (“Six state supreme courts have adopted
Smith’s rational-basis test.”).
68. See LeDoux v. LeDoux, 234 Neb. 479, 452 N.W.2d 1 (1990). In LeDoux, the claim
was based solely on the Free Exercise Clause. Additionally, neither the majority
nor concurring opinions mention Nebraska’s Conscience Clause.
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The Nebraska Supreme Court interpreted Nebraska’s Conscience
Clause for the first time in 1996.69  Following this interpretation, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that RFRA is inapplicable to the states be-
cause such application exceeds Congress’s authority under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.70
In In re Interest of Anaya,71 the Nebraska Supreme Court inter-
preted Nebraska’s Conscience Clause as requiring what the Free Ex-
ercise Clause requires. In doing so, the court held that the Smith
standard was appropriate to apply to interferences with religious ex-
ercise under Nebraska’s Conscience Clause.72 As a result, every neu-
tral and generally applicable law that burdens the right of conscience
is constitutional under the Nebraska constitution so long as the State
presents any rational basis for the law that causes the undue burden.
In applying the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause to Nebraska’s Conscience Clause, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court explicitly recognized that the Conscience Clause was tex-
tually distinct from the Free Exercise Clause.73 Yet the court
determined that it was “not prepared to accord these textual differ-
ences weight in terms of their constitutional significance.”74 Instead,
the Nebraska Supreme Court determined that the two provisions were
similar enough to permit the court to interpret them in congruence.75
Since 2008, the Nebraska Supreme Court has not readdressed the
Conscience Clause’s meaning and purpose. As a result, the rational
basis test continues to apply under the Nebraska constitution to all
conscience rights violations caused by neutral and generally applica-
ble laws.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Rules of Constitutional Interpretation
The Nebraska Supreme Court has constructed a rule wherein con-
scientious objectors have no relief under the Nebraska Conscience
Clause for any burden imposed upon them so long as the State
presents a rational basis for the neutral and generally applicable
law.76 The court improperly established this rule by looking solely to
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Smith to interpret the Nebraska
69. Palmer v. Palmer, 249 Neb. 814, 545 N.W.2d 751 (1996).
70. 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
71. 276 Neb. 825, 758 N.W.2d 10 (2008).
72. Id. at 835, 758 N.W.2d at 19.
73. Id. at 834, 758 N.W.2d at 18 (“With respect to the textual argument, we recognize
that the language of the state and federal provisions at issue differs.”).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 834, 758 N.W.2d at 19.
76. Id. at 835, 758 N.W.2d at 19.
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constitution’s Conscience Clause.77 In deferring to Smith in its inter-
pretation of the Conscience Clause, the court focused only on the “sim-
ilar rights” that the Free Exercise Clause and Conscience Clause are
intended to protect, without analyzing or giving significance to the
Conscience Clause on an independent textual basis.78
The Nebraska Supreme Court recognized “that the language of the
[Conscience Clause] and [Free Exercise Clause] at issue differs.”79
However, the court followed this recognition by stating, “we are not
prepared to accord these textual differences weight in terms of their
constitutional significance.”80 In other words, the court recognized the
textual distinctions of each provision while simultaneously declining
to interpret the actual meaning and purpose of the Conscience
Clause’s textual differences.
The Nebraska Supreme Court ultimately disposed of the Con-
science Clause’s intended protections by declining to analyze the pro-
vision’s unique language, history, and purpose. The court has yet to
remedy this fault. The Nebraska Supreme Court has boldly over-
turned precedent when its past decisions clearly violated rules of stat-
utory construction—including precedent reaffirmed by the court over
a dozen times in less than one decade.81 The court should be even
more prepared to properly apply rules of constitutional construction to
Nebraska’s constitution and to overturn precedent accordingly be-
cause, unlike statutes, the legislature cannot overturn the constitu-
tional decrees of the judiciary—even when the decisions violate basic
rules of construction.
Nebraska Supreme Court precedent stresses that its state consti-
tution’s “terms must be taken in the ordinary and common accepta-
tion, because they are supposed to have been so understood by the
framers and by the people who adopted it. This is unquestionably the
correct rule of interpretation.”82 Overall, when each component of the
77. Id. at 834, 758 N.W.2d at 18.
78. Id. at 834, 758 N.W.2d at 19.
79. Id. at 834, 758 N.W.2d at 18.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. For example, the Nebraska Supreme Court, in a single decision, overturned eigh-
teen cases that erroneously interpreted a Nebraska statute to include malice as a
necessary element of second degree murder. State v. Burlison, 255 Neb. 190,
194–96, 583 N.W.2d 31, 35–36 (1998) (quoting State v. Irons, 254 Neb. 18, 574
N.W.2d 144 (1998)) (“When a case requires the interpretation of a statute, we
have ‘an obligation to reach an independent, correct conclusion irrespective of the
determination made by the courts below.’”).
82. First Tr. Co. of Lincoln v. Smith, 134 Neb. 84, 104, 277 N.W. 762, 773 (1938). The
court further asserted, “Decisions of [the] [S]upreme [C]ourt of [the] United
States construing provisions of [the] federal Constitution are not binding on state
court in construing similar provisions of [Nebraska’s] state Constitution.” Id. at
772 (quoting Wilson Banking Co. Liquidating Corp. v. Colvard, 161 So. 123, 127
(Miss. 1935).
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provision is properly interpreted, the Conscience Clause’s purpose be-
comes evident: it is intended to prevent any interference of rights of
conscience under all laws, including interference caused by neutral
and generally applicable laws.
1. The Conscience Clause Rendered Meaningless and
Surplusage
When the Nebraska Supreme Court ignored the textual differences
between the Free Exercise Clause and Nebraska’s Conscience Clause,
the court failed to follow well-established rules of interpretation and,
in effect, rendered the text of the Conscience Clause meaningless and
mere surplusage.83 The Conscience Clause contains entirely dissimi-
lar language from the Free Exercise Clause,84 yet the Nebraska judici-
ary continues to apply to its state provision the federal judiciary’s
interpretation of a federal constitutional provision.85 The two clauses
contain wholly different language, and the Conscience Clause should
be interpreted on an independent basis.86
The Free Exercise Clause again states, “Congress shall make no
law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”87 In looking at the
language “free exercise,” the Smith Court determined this right in-
cludes the freedom to believe in and profess one’s religion, as well as
the right to act out one’s religion.88 The Smith Court then interpreted
the full phrase “prohibiting the free exercise” and determined the
phrase meant a prohibition only on laws that specifically target and
intend to restrict these freedoms.89
By applying the U.S. Supreme Court’s Smith standard to its state
Conscience Clause, the Nebraska Supreme Court effectively added
83. See State ex rel. Spire v. Beermann, 235 Neb. 384, 390, 455 N.W.2d 749, 752
(1990).
84. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I with NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4.
85. Anaya, 276 Neb. at 835, 758 N.W.2d at 19 (“[P]rovisions of the Nebraska Consti-
tution protect the same rights as the Free Exercise Clause of the federal Consti-
tution, we will review . . . under the same standard . . . .”).
86. See JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 174 (2018) (“There is no reason to think, as an
interpretive matter, that constitutional guarantees of independent sovereigns,
even guarantees with the same or similar words, must be construed in the same
way.”).
87. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
88. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (listing exam-
ples of religious actions, such as “assembling with others for a worship service,
participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining
from certain foods or certain modes of transportation”).
89. Id. at 878–79 (stating laws that are not aimed at religious exercise are free from
the constraints of the Free Exercise Clause as long as the state has any rational
basis for the law). For an in-depth discussion on the rational basis test and criti-
ques against it, see Clark Neily, No Such Thing: Litigating Under the Rational
Basis Test, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 897 (2005).
904 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:890
these words from the Free Exercise Clause to the Conscience Clause—
omitting from its analysis the actual text of the Conscience Clause.
This approach violated the court’s rules of construction for numerous
reasons. To start, the Free Exercise Clause was constructed sepa-
rately from and with different language than the Nebraska Con-
science Clause; treating these textual differences between the state
and federal provision as asserting the same right fails to give each
word a useful meaning in light of the provision as a whole.
The preeminent rule the Nebraska Supreme Court violated when
it assigned the Free Exercise Clause’s interpretation to the Conscience
Clause is the rule that no part of Nebraska’s state constitution shall
be treated as superfluous.90 Every word of the document must be
given meaning because each and every clause of the Nebraska Consti-
tution is included for a useful purpose.91 The court cannot add nor
omit words from a constitutional provision.92 The Conscience Clause
“must be construed as a whole, and no part will be rejected as mean-
ingless or surplusage.”93
Further, the U.S. Supreme Court was interpreting the text of a fed-
eral constitutional provision, not the Conscience Clause, when it ap-
plied the rational basis standard of review in Smith for all religious
exercise claims. Unlike the Free Exercise Clause, the Nebraska Con-
science Clause does not contain the language “free exercise,” nor does
it express that Congress is prevented from prohibiting these rights.94
Rather, the Conscience Clause states that the dictates of conscience
cannot be interfered with.95 The court’s interpretation thus added the
words of the Free Exercise Clause to the Conscience Clause and omit-
ted the words of the Conscience Clause when it assigned the Smith
Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause to its textually dis-
tinct state provision.
Finally, there are distinct structural differences between the text
of the state and federal provision. The Conscience Clause expresses a
positive right of the people—that “all persons have the natural and
indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of
their own consciences.”96 The clause recognizes and affirms a right
90. Fisher v. PayFlex Sys. USA, Inc., 285 Neb. 808, 817–18, 829 N.W.2d 703, 712
(2013).
91. Anderson v. Tiemann, 182 Neb. 393, 397, 155 N.W.2d 322, 326 (1967).
92. State ex rel. Spire v. Beermann, 235 Neb. 384, 389–90, 455 N.W.2d 749, 752
(1990).
93. Id.
94. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Id. (emphasis added).
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that all people inherently hold97—one “which the government itself
may not deprive the individual.”98 In contrast, the Free Exercise
Clause is phrased as a negative right—“Congress can make no law
. . . .”99 The Free Exercise Clause expresses a restraint on Congress
from prohibiting the right of free exercise.100 But while the text of the
Free Exercise Clause restricts government’s direct prohibition of free
exercise, the Conscience Clause forbids interference with the rights of
conscience. “[A]ny interference”101 with the rights of conscience, re-
gardless of whether the law facially prohibits these rights, is not per-
mitted102 when the text of the Conscience Clause is facially
considered.
Neither the positive right of conscience nor the prohibition on any
interference of this right is mentioned in the Free Exercise Clause. If
the Nebraska Supreme Court had given every word meaning in light
of its useful purpose, the court would have acknowledged the unique
differences in the plain text and the recognized rights. Neither the af-
firmative right that all people naturally and indefeasibly hold the
right of conscience nor the admonition that government shall never
interfere with this right were even considered.103 All the pertinent
language in the provision was dismissed as “perfunctory language—
merely stylistic window dressing.”104 The court failed to give the posi-
tive rights of conscience meaning in light of the provision as a whole
and thus treated each word of the Conscience Clause as merely redun-
dant of the Free Exercise Clause.105
97. See id. (“All persons have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own consciences. . . . [N]or shall any inter-
ference with the rights of conscience be permitted.”) (emphasis added).
98. Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1133 (1999).
99. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
100. Terrance J. Fleming & Jack Nordby, The Minnesota Bill of Rights: “Wrapt in the
Old Miasmal Mist”, 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 67 (1984); Patrick, supra note 37, at
357 (citing Richard E. Shugrue, Faithful to the Constitution: The Roadblock for
Nebraska’s Schools, 79 NEB. L. REV. 884, 897–98 (2000)).
101. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4 (emphasis added).
102. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 25, at 1418–19. McConnell offers examples of
laws that are facially neutral that nevertheless interfere with religious exercise.
See id. at 1419 (“[A] general prohibition of alcohol consumption could make the
Christian sacrament of communion illegal, [and] uniform regulation of meat
preparation could put kosher slaughterhouses out of business.”).
103. Anderson v. Tiemann, 182 Neb. 393, 397, 155 N.W.2d 322, 326 (1967).
104. Hammons, supra note 28, at 235.
105. Fisher v. PayFlex Sys. USA, Inc., 285 Neb. 808, 817–18, 829 N.W.2d 703, 712
(2013); State ex rel. Spire v. Beermann, 235 Neb. 384, 389–90, 455 N.W.2d 749,
752 (1990); Anderson, 182 Neb. at 397, 155 N.W.2d at 326.
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2. Interpretation According to the Original Meaning and
Purpose
In order to assign proper meaning to each word of the Conscience
Clause,106 the Nebraska Supreme Court must look to the original
meaning of the provision. In determining the original meaning, Ne-
braska Supreme Court precedent requires the court to consider both
the historical background and intended purpose of the constitutional
provision.107 The main inquiry in this determination is “[t]he intent
and understanding of [the] framers and the people who adopted it as
expressed in the instrument.”108 In conducting this inquiry, the court
may “consider the facts of history in determining the meaning of the
language of the Constitution.”109
a. The History of Religion in Nebraska
First, the history of Nebraska clearly demonstrates that the intent
of its constitution’s framers was to prohibit interference with the
rights of conscience. A historical aspect of critical significance in inter-
preting the meaning of the Conscience Clause is the wide variety of
denominations present in the state prior to and during the time of the
clause’s ratification110 and the fundamental role that religion played
in the societal and constitutional structure in Nebraska’s years as a
territory and early state.111 The variety of denominations led to Ne-
braska having “vastly more freedom of thought and independent ac-
tion . . . than . . . any of the older States.”112 There were a variety of
religious denominations amongst individuals who resided in the terri-
tory, and religion itself was central to the lives of these individuals. In
fact, “[r]eligious belief was a sturdy strand in the social fabric of Ne-
braska in the late nineteenth century.”113 Because of this, the terri-
tory developed a culture that prioritized the freedom to believe and act
according to one’s beliefs.
This diversity of religious denominations and the influence it had
on the Conscience Clause are evidence that the Conscience Clause’s
use of strong language, distinct from the Free Exercise Clause, re-
106. Beermann, 235 Neb. at 389–90, 455 N.W.2d at 752.
107. State ex rel. Lemon v. Gale, 272 Neb. 295, 304, 721 N.W.2d 347, 355–56 (2006);
Jaksha v. State, 222 Neb. 690, 693, 385 N.W.2d 922, 924 (1986).
108. Beermann, 235 Neb. at 389–90, 455 N.W.2d at 752.
109. Id.
110. See Patrick, supra note 37, at 342–43 n.77 (referencing early documentation ar-
ticulating the wide variety of religious groups and religious freedom in Nebraska
prior to and at the time of its statehood).
111. Id. at 338; supra text accompanying note 32.
112. L.D. BURCH, NEBRASKA AS IT IS: A COMPREHENSIVE SUMMARY OF THE RESOURCES,
ADVANTAGES AND DRAWBACKS OF THE GREAT PRAIRIE STATE 14, 108 (1878), re-
printed in Patrick, supra note 37, at 342–43 n.78.
113. FREDERICK C. LUEBKE, NEBRASKA: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 178 (1995).
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flected Nebraska’s territorial history114 and was intentionally in-
cluded to provide robust religious protections. Applying the lowest
level of constitutional scrutiny to conscience rights claims disregards
the Nebraska framers’ intent to protect the right of conscience. As a
result, rational basis review of neutral and generally applicable laws
permits the law to take precedent over the precious right to worship
“according to the dictates of . . . conscience . . . .”115
b. Perfect Toleration of Religion
In addition to the aforementioned history, Nebraska’s journey to
statehood provides further evidence of the original meaning of the
Conscience Clause. When the territory of Nebraska sought to attain
statehood, Congress imposed certain conditions on the territory.116
One condition of particular significance was the requirement that the
state’s constitution provide for “perfect toleration of religious senti-
ment” and protect religious worship from being molested or interfered
with.117 In order to satisfy this requirement, the Territory of Ne-
braska drafted the version of what would later be adopted as the Con-
science Clause.118 Because Nebraska was admitted to the Union, the
language of the Conscience Clause must have, at a minimum, pro-
vided for perfect toleration of religious sentiment and protected relig-
ious worship from being molested or interfered with.119
Toleration of religion means to “live and let live.”120 In other
words, religious toleration ensures every individual is free to “live his
[or her] own life in accordance with religious conscience and convic-
114. See State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990); infra text accompa-
nying notes 147–154.
115. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4.
116. JOSEPH ELLIOTT COBBEY, COBBEY’S ANNOTATED STATUTES OF NEBRASKA 50 (1911).
Two conditions that Congress required the Territory of Nebraska to secure in
order to become a state were that “perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall
be secured,” and no one “shall ever be molested in person or property on account
of his or her mode of religious worship.” An additional condition was that slavery
“be forever prohibited . . . .” Id.
117. See id.
118. The language of the 1866 Conscience Clause is nearly identical to Nebraska’s
current Conscience Clause:
The Convention of 1875 returned to a formulation of the Religious Free-
dom Provision that was nearly exactly that of the 1866 Constitution. Be-
sides changing the opening words “All men,” to “All persons,” the only
substantive change was removing the phrase “or maintain any form of
worship against his consent” in the second sentence.
Patrick, supra note 37; see also GAUL, supra note 24 (providing a side-by-side
comparison of past and current Nebraska Constitution provision language).
119. See Patrick, supra note 37, at 342–43.
120. Michael W. McConnell, Religion and Constitutional Rights: Why Is Religious Lib-
erty the “First Freedom”?, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1243, 1259 (2000).
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tion.”121 For individuals to be able to live accordingly, the government
cannot infringe on religious exercise rights either directly—through
laws that expressly prohibit religious exercise—or indirectly—
through laws that require individuals to abandon their religious con-
victions in order to attain “an equal place in the civil community”122—
and still maintain religious toleration. The earliest definitions make
clear that perfect toleration demands that religious exercise must be
“respected, accommodated, and protected”123 as an inalienable natu-
ral right that government “may never infringe.”124 If the rights of con-
science are not secured, perfect toleration—perfect protection—is
relinquished because individuals are precluded from living according
to their convictions.125
The Smith standard does not afford perfect toleration of conscience
rights by the state. For example, in In re Interest of Anaya126—the
case where the Nebraska Supreme Court misapplied the Smith stan-
dard to the Conscience Clause—the court concluded that the Anayas
had no Conscience Clause claim.127 The Anayas held a sincere relig-
ious belief that metabolic infant testing required removing life128 from
their son. However, the Anayas’ belief was not respected or accommo-
dated under the neutral and generally applicable standard applied by
the court. By demanding the Anayas violate their sincerely held relig-
ious belief or face the consequences—loss of custody of their five-week
old son129—the Anayas were unable to live according to their own con-
121. Id. (emphasis added). Professor McConnell emphasizes that religious tolerance
dates back to the founding of the United States and the discussions surrounding
its establishment. Id.
122. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 897 (1990) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
123. PAULSEN & PAULSEN, supra note 29, at 100.
124. Id. (emphasis added) (“In America, religion is . . . a fundamental, inalienable,
(literally) God-given natural right.”); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
396 (1923) (holding a statute was unconstitutional because it forbade teaching in
public school in any language other than English: “[W]e should not overlook the
fact that the spirit of American [sic] is liberty and toleration—the disposition to
allow each person to live his own life in his own way”).
125. PAULSEN & PAULSEN, supra note 29, at 101 (“[G]overnment cannot keep someone
from exercising religion, even if this may mean departing from its usual rules in
order to permit individuals and groups freely to exercise their religious beliefs.”).
126. 276 Neb. 825, 758 N.W.2d 10 (2008).
127. Id. at 836, 758 N.W.2d at 20.
128. It was not disputed that the Anayas sincerely believed “life is taken from the
body if blood is removed from it and that a person’s lifespan may be shortened if
blood is drawn.” Douglas Cty. v. Anaya, 269 Neb. 552, 554, 694 N.W.2d 601, 604
(2005).
129. The Nebraska Supreme Court ultimately held that the removal of custody by the
lower court was an improper exercise of jurisdiction. Anaya, 276 Neb. at 838, 758
N.W.2d at 20. However, the Anayas’ religious convictions had still been violated,
as their son’s blood was removed without their consent while he was in the
State’s custody.
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sciences without facing legal consequence. If the Conscience Clause’s
original meaning of perfect toleration had been afforded, the Anayas
would not have been forced to choose between living according to their
consciences or violating their consciences—a decision they were re-
quired to make under the court’s interpretation. Stated plainly, per-
fect toleration was not afforded under the court’s interpretation of the
Conscience Clause.
c. The Intent of Nebraska’s Framers and Citizens
The Conscience Clause’s “terms must be taken in the ordinary and
common acceptation, because they are supposed to have been so un-
derstood by the framers and by the people who adopted it.”130 Thus,
building upon the determination that Nebraska’s journey to statehood
requires the language of the Conscience Clause to prohibit intolerance
and coercion, the ratification history of the Conscience Clause solidi-
fies that its unique language reflects the intent and understanding of
the people who drafted and adopted it. Simply stated, the Conscience
Clause’s ratification history provides further insight into its original
meaning.
Following admission to statehood in 1866, Nebraska held a consti-
tutional convention in 1871 to create a binding state constitution.131
In drafting this proposed constitution, the Nebraska framers looked to
other state constitutions; specifically, the Nebraska framers relied
heavily on the language of the 1870 Illinois Constitution.132 The lan-
guage of Nebraska’s proposed religion provision was nearly identical
130. First Tr. Co. v. Smith, 134 Neb. 84, 277 N.W. 762, 773 (1938) (quoting State v.
Bacon, 6 Neb. 286 (1877)).
131. OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE 1871 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 36, at 10.
To clarify, the proposed constitution of 1866 was not a legally binding constitu-
tion; it was proposed in order for Nebraska to meet conditions in its pursuit to
attain statehood. The Constitutional Convention of 1871 and 1875 sought to cre-
ate and ratify a binding Constitution.
132. Id. Nebraska’s proposed language in 1871 stated in full:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination, shall forever be guaranteed; and no person shall
be denied any civil or political right, privilege or capacity on account of
his religious opinions; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall
not be construed to dispense with oaths or affirmations, excuse acts of
licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety
of the state. No person shall be required to attend or support any minis-
try or place of worship, nor shall any preference be given by law to any
religious denomination or mode of worship.
Id. The 1871 constitution was different than the 1866 constitution written to join
the Union. Because the 1866 constitution’s main purpose was to meet minimum
qualifications for attaining statehood, the people realized its inadequacy. Thus, a
movement for a new constitutional convention grew and was approved by voters
in 1871. Patrick, supra note 37, at 344 (citing MIEWALD & LONGO, THE NEBRASKA
STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (1993)).
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to the language of Illinois’s provision, which guaranteed free exercise
to the people with limitations.133 However, when the 1871 proposed
constitution was submitted to the people of Nebraska for approval, the
language, along with the entire proposed constitution, was defeated at
the polls.134
In 1875, Nebraska held a second constitutional convention to draft
a binding state constitution.135 The 1875 drafters chose to include
most of the same language from the 1871 proposed constitution,136
but one exception was of particular importance. The Conscience
Clause drafters chose not to include any of the basic free exercise lan-
guage from the 1871 provision, and instead chose to restore the con-
science language from the 1866 proposed constitution.137 The 1875
provision re-adopted the liberty of conscience language.138
This reverted language was entirely different from language in the
rejected 1871 constitution. The proposed language in 1875 reaffirmed
the conscience rights of Nebraskans,139 and any interference with con-
science rights would be prohibited.140 Thus, the 1875 language shifted
from a free exercise right that was guaranteed with limitations, to an
133. See ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 3; supra text accompanying note 132. The 1871
Nebraska religion clause proposal omitted the Illinois’s phrase “against his con-
sent.” The language was otherwise an exact adoption of Illinois’s provision. OFFI-
CIAL REPORT OF THE 1871 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 36, at 218–19.
The meaning and purpose behind limitation provisions in state constitutions is
outside the scope of this Comment. For a discussion on these provisions, see gen-
erally Marci A. Hamilton, The “Licentiousness” in Religious Organizations and
Why It Is Not Protected Under Religious Liberty Constitutional Provisions, 18
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 953 (2010).
134. One known reason for the constitution’s failure to be ratified was the provision
that required all religious property valued over five thousand dollars to be taxed.
See Patrick, supra note 37, at 347; A. B. Winter, Constitutional Revision in Ne-
braska: A Brief History and Commentary, 40 NEB. L. REV. 580, 582 (1961).
135. See Winter, supra note 134, at 583.
136. See id. (“As a basis of departure, the convention used the rejected constitution of
1871, which had in turn been modeled upon the Illinois Constitution of 1870.”);
supra text accompanying note 118.
137. See supra text accompanying note 118.
138. See id.; see also NEBRASKA: THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE 519 (Addison E. Sheldon
ed., 1931), reprinted in Patrick, supra note 37, at 350 n.129 (“In section four relat-
ing to religious freedom more emphasis is given to religion, thereby interpreting
the more active religious sentiment of 1875.”); Patrick, supra note 37, at 350 (“In
terms of religion, probably the only important change rendered by the 1875 Con-
vention was a modification of the Religious Freedom Provision to highlight the
positive aspects of religion and reduce the number of occasions when it would not
apply.”).
139. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4.
140. Id. (“[N]or shall any interference with the rights of conscience be permitted.”)
(emphasis added).
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absolute freedom from government interference of conscience
rights.141
The change in language from the 1871 to the 1875 Conscience
Clause is revealing. If the drafters believed that the language of the
1871 proposed provision accurately reflected their beliefs, they would
have proposed the same language in 1875—just as they did for a ma-
jority of the 1871 constitution’s language.142 Instead, the drafters re-
adopted the liberty of conscience language, demonstrating that this
conscience language—not the rejected free exercise language—most
clearly reflected the beliefs of the Nebraska framers at the time of the
current Conscience Clause’s drafting.
The ratification of the current Conscience Clause’s language also
reflects the intent of Nebraska’s voters. Unlike the proposed 1871 con-
stitution, Nebraska’s current Conscience Clause language was ratified
at the ballot box in 1875.143 Nebraskans demonstrated their agree-
ment with the language through their votes; the people of Nebraska
overwhelmingly chose to ratify this language along with the remain-
der of the proposed constitution.144 This ratification was not a mere
formality; history shows Nebraskans did not passively approve lan-
guage they did not agree with.145 Thus, Nebraskans’ rejection of the
basic free exercise language and adoption of the Conscience Clause’s
unique language evinces the intent of Nebraskans at the time of en-
actment: to protect the natural and indefeasible rights of conscience.
d. Other States’ Conscience Provisions
Another aspect of Nebraska’s history that provides insight into the
meaning and intent of the Conscience Clause is the Nebraska framers’
ability to reflect on the experiences of other states regarding protec-
tion of conscience rights. At the time of the Conscience Clause’s draft-
ing, Nebraska’s framers had before them three dozen states that had
implemented, tested, and tried religion clauses in their state constitu-
tions.146 This allowed the Nebraska drafters to consider the failures
141. NEBRASKA CONSTITUTIONS OF 1866, 1871 & 1875 AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
SUBMITTED TO THE PEOPLE SEPTEMBER 21, 1920 9 (Addison Sheldon ed., 1920)
(“[The] positive recognition of religion justly interprets the more active religious
sentiment of that time.”). The shift from including “free exercise” to ensuring
freedom of conscience is what Sheldon is referring to regarding the “more active
religious sentiment,” and the push for greater religious protection. See Patrick,
supra note 37, at 357.
142. See supra text accompanying note 141.
143. See supra text accompanying note 134; see also Patrick, supra note 37, at 350
(“[T]he Constitution of 1875 was approved by the voters by a count of [30,332] to
[5,474].”) (citing JAMES C. OLSON, HISTORY OF NEBRASKA 183 (1966)).
144. See supra note 143.
145. See supra subsection III.A.2.c.
146. Dates of Statehood: National (U.S.) Succession of States, STATE SYMBOLS USA,
https://statesymbolsusa.org/symbol-official-item/national-us/statehood-date/date-
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and successes of other states when drafting their own conscience
provision.147
In choosing which state constitutions to borrow language from,
drafters often looked to states that shared a common heritage and
similar values.148 This allowed the borrowed provisions to accurately
reflect the adopting state’s history and values.149 The provisions the
drafters borrowed thus reflected the adopting state’s history and val-
ues.150 Because the Conscience Clause was modeled after other states’
constitutional provisions,151 the historical meaning and judicial deter-
minations of these early states’ near-identical provisions are instruc-
tive in determining the meaning of Nebraska’s Conscience Clause.
Three midwestern states—Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Ohio—had
state constitutional conscience clauses at the time Nebraska was
drafting its own.152 All three states’ provisions are very similar to Ne-
statehood [https://perma.unl.edu/FN3B-WE2C] (stating thirty-six states had
been admitted to the Union prior to Nebraska’s statehood); see also Christian G.
Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary Observa-
tions on State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth-Century West, 25 RUTGERS
L.J. 945, 975 (1994) (“[V]irtually all [nineteenth century] conventions were influ-
enced by earlier constitutions, constitutional experience, practice, and
interpretations.”).
147. See, e.g., Minn. Const. of 1857, art. I, § 16. Wisconsin voters ratified its 1848 state
constitution by vote in March of 1848. See The State Constitutions of 1846 and
1848, WIS. HIST. SOC’Y, https://www.wisconsinhistory.org/turningpoints/tp-015/?
action=more_essay [https://perma.unl.edu/9MML-46HF]. Minnesota’s conscience
provision was ratified in 1857. Constitution of the State of Minnesota, OFFICE RE-
VISOR STATUTES, https://www.revisor.mn.gov/constitution/#article_1 [https://per
ma.unl.edu/RJT4-SVVP] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
148. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 205 (1998).
149. Id. at 205–09.
150. First Tr. Co. v. Smith, 134 Neb. 84, 112, 277 N.W. 762, 776 (1938). In First Trust
Company, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated that when looking to constitu-
tional provisions borrowed from other states,
[I]n the absence of expressed contrary intention, the adoption of a statu-
tory or constitutional provision from another state accepts the meaning
of such adopted provision that it carried in the context of which it origi-
nally formed a part and, if it had been previously construed by the courts
of such state, the judicial determination thus made.
Id.
151. Although Nebraska adopted most of the language in Illinois’s Constitution of
1870 for its 1875 constitution, Nebraska’s 1875 Conscience Clause was an excep-
tion. See Winter, supra note 134, at 583. Though it is unclear exactly which
state(s) Nebraska adopted its Conscience Clause from, it can be assumed Ne-
braska reflected on other states’—particularly midwestern states’—conscience
provisions because many of these states’ conscience provisions were nearly identi-
cal to Nebraska’s 1875 Conscience Clause. Minnesota’s, Ohio’s, and Wisconsin’s
conscience provisions are three examples, and their provisions are discussed
next.
152. In addition to Nebraskans’ Conscience Clause being very similar to their con-
science provisions, individuals from Minnesota and Wisconsin had extensive in-
fluence in Nebraska at the time it attained statehood. For example, attorney
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braska’s.153 In drafting their respective conscience clauses, these
states intended to create stronger religious protection than the protec-
tion afforded under the Free Exercise Clause.154
For example, Wisconsin reflected on other states’ failures to afford
comprehensive protection for conscience rights when it drafted and
ratified its 1848 conscience provision, which furnished “a more-com-
plete bar to any preference for, or discrimination against, any relig-
ious sect, organization or society than any other state in the
Union.”155 This bar is reflected in Nebraska’s Conscience Clause lan-
guage.156 Similarly, Minnesota drafted and ratified language in 1857
to afford stronger protection to the diverse religious denominations re-
siding within the state and to provide greater protection from relig-
ious persecution.157 The decision of Nebraska’s Conscience Clause
drafters to adopt conscience language from states like Wisconsin and
Minnesota signals the intent of these drafters to require more protec-
Experience Eastabrook of Wisconsin was appointed to play a leading role in or-
ganizing the territory of Nebraska and was eventually a constitutional conven-
tion delegate in the 1870s. See D.C. DUNBAR, OMAHA ILLUSTRATED 74 (Alfred
Rasmus Sorenson ed., 2012) (1888). Further, Minnesota played an integral part
in Nebraska’s then-establishing railroad system in the early 1860s, which con-
nected to Illinois—a state with well-known influence on Nebraska’s current Con-
stitution—Wisconsin, and Minnesota. See, e.g., ALBERT WATKINS, HISTORY OF
NEBRASKA: FROM THE EARLIEST EXPLORATIONS TO THE PRESENT TIME WITH POR-
TRAITS, MAPS, AND TABLES VOL. III 447 (1913).
153. Compare NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4, with MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“The right of
every man to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience shall
never be infringed . . . .”), and OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 7 (“All men have a
natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates
of their own conscience.”), and WIS. CONST. of 1848, art. I, § 18 (“The right of
every man to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of his own con-
science, shall never be infringed, . . . nor shall any control of or interference with
the rights of conscience be permitted . . . .”). Twenty-nine states were admitted
prior to Wisconsin’s, and thirty-one states prior to Minnesota’s admission. Thus,
Nebraska had even more state provisions to glean from. See supra text accompa-
nying note 146.
154. State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 241 (Wis. 1996) (holding Employment Division v.
Smith is not binding on its state constitution’s conscience clause when its state’s
precedent and unique history are considered separate from the Free Exercise
Clause, and concluding strict scrutiny—not the neutral and generally applicable
standard in Smith—is required by its conscience provision); State v. Hersh-
berger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 1990) (concluding its conscience provision
intended to afford stronger protection than Smith to diverse denominations to
prevent intolerance and persecution in the state and holding strict scrutiny ap-
plies to its conscience provision).
155. See Miller, 549 N.W.2d at 239 (quoting State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 115
N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1962)); see supra text accompanying note 147.
156. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4; discussion supra Part I.
157. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d at 398 (citing State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn.
1990)).
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tion of conscience rights than the Free Exercise Clause requires158
and a more complete bar on any interference of these rights.159
Ohio’s conscience clause is the most similar to Nebraska’s; the two
clauses are nearly identical.160 Ohio became a state in 1803161—over
60 years before Nebraska joined the Union. It is one of the states that
Nebraska framers could have looked towards when learning from “the
experience of others.”162 In stark contrast to the Nebraska Supreme
Court’s approach, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that its state
conscience clause provision not only provides more protection, but it
also protects entirely different rights than the federal provision.163
The Ohio Supreme Court in Humphrey v. Lane concluded that Ohio’s
conscience clause afforded much broader protection than the federal
Free Exercise Clause.164 More specifically, the Humphrey court as-
serted its conscience provision affords relief for undue burdens created
by neutral and generally applicable laws.165
The court in Humphrey distinguished the phrase, “nor shall any
interference with the rights of conscience be permitted” from the Free
Exercise Clause’s language.166 Further, the court interpreted the
word “interference” to mean preventing “even . . . tangential ef-
fects”167 on freedom of conscience. In other words, the Ohio conscience
clause was intended to prevent even indirect interference with the
rights of conscience, including when the law is neutral and generally
applicable.168 The Humphrey court concluded that it is “not bound by
federal court interpretations of the federal Constitution in interpret-
ing [its] own Constitution,”169 and under the clause’s proper interpre-
tation, Ohio’s religious freedom provision provides broader protections
than the federal Free Exercise Clause.
158. See supra text accompanying note 154.
159. Miller, 549 N.W.2d at 239 (quoting Reynolds, 115 N.W.2d 761).
160. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7 reads in pertinent part, “All men have a natural and inde-
feasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own con-
science. . . . [N]or shall any interference with the rights of conscience be
permitted.” The clause also states in striking similarity to Nebraska’s clause that
“[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge, however, being essential to good govern-
ment, it shall be the duty of the general assembly to pass suitable laws to protect
every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of pub-
lic worship . . . .” NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4.
161. Historical Highlights: The Admission of Ohio as a State, HIST., ART & ARCHIVES,
http://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1951-2000/The-admission-of-Ohio-
as-a-state/ [https://perma.unl.edu/N6SQ-XS7T].
162. Reynolds, 115 N.W.2d at 769–70.
163. Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1044 (Ohio 2000).
164. Id. at 1045.
165. Id.
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Although the Nebraska Supreme Court has expressed disinterest
in looking to other courts’ decisions concerning their respective state
constitutions,170 looking to other states’ conscience clauses is instruc-
tive in light of Nebraska’s lack of documentation from its 1875 consti-
tutional convention,171 and because Nebraska, along with other
states, borrowed language from earlier state constitutions and incor-
porated this language into its own.172
Further, the Nebraska Supreme Court should be looking to other
states’ constitutions before relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s inter-
pretation of the federal Constitution.173 In other words, if the Ne-
braska Supreme Court is going to lockstep the Conscience Clause’s
meaning with another constitutional provision, the court should be
looking to other state constitutional provisions, not a federal constitu-
tional provision. As the Honorable Jeffrey S. Sutton emphasized,
If the court decisions of another sovereign ought to bear on the inquiry, those
of a sister state should have the most to say about the point. Two state consti-
tutions are more likely to share historical and linguistic roots. They necessa-
rily will cover smaller jurisdictions than the National High Court. . . . And
they will be exercising a power—judicial review—that originated in state con-
stitutional law, not in federal constitutional law.174
Ultimately, looking beyond Nebraska to other states that adopted
nearly identical conscience clauses gives insight to the original mean-
ing of the clause.
After applying basic rules of constitutional interpretation; consid-
ering the Conscience Clause’s history and purpose; and looking to
other states’ interpretations of near-identical conscience provisions,
the Nebraska Supreme Court cannot soundly conclude that the Con-
science Clause allows the lowest level of constitutional review to apply
to conscience rights claims. Simply, the original meaning of the Con-
170. State ex rel. Spire v. Pub. Emp. Retirement Bd., 226 Neb. 176, 181, 410 N.W.2d
463, 466 (1987) (“[R]elying on other decisions by other courts which in turn relied
upon provisions of other constitutions serves little purpose in determining the
meaning of our own specific Constitution.”).
171. While debates and proceedings of constitutional conventions are often essential
to understanding the original meaning of state constitutional provisions, this is
not a viable option for Nebraska’s Conscience Clause: there is no record of the
1875 Constitutional Convention. Patrick, supra note 37, at 345. Evidently, Ne-
braska “refused to hire a shorthand reporter due to budget restraints and other
extenuating circumstances.” Id. Discussions at the 1871 convention do shed light
on the importance of religion at the time. For instance, even in the midst of budg-
etary constraints, an official Chaplain was hired to open each day with prayer,
most invoking “Almighty God” and Jesus. See id. at 346 n.96 and accompanying
text. Further, the Convention discussed Sunday Sabbath laws and tax exemp-
tions for religious purposes. Id. at 346.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 151–155.
173. See GEORGE ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 205 (1998).
174. SUTTON, supra note 86, at 175 (citing Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of
State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323, 339 n.80 (2011).
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science Clause cannot permit the Smith standard to apply. Because
Smith’s rational basis standard does not permit Nebraska citizens to
live according to their conscientious convictions175 under all laws that
burden conscience rights, the current judicial standard does not re-
flect the originally understood meaning and purpose of Nebraska’s
state constitutional provision.176
B. Conscience Rights in a Constitutional Republic
Not only did the Nebraska Supreme Court fail to render a proper
meaning to its state constitutional provision by equating the Con-
science Clause with the Free Exercise Clause, but it also undermined
state autonomy by deviating from fundamental principles of federal-
ism embedded in the United States’ structure as a constitutional re-
public. Federalism—rooted in the theory of dual sovereignty177—is
wounded when Nebraska’s state constitution is interpreted on a de-
pendent basis with its federal counterpart. State constitutions are doc-
uments with independent force.178 Independent analysis of these
documents permits states to grant more protection to their citizens
than the federal Constitution, and it preserves the voice of the people
by safeguarding citizens’ ability to engage in direct democracy through
the ratification and amendment process in this constitutional
republic.179
1. State Autonomy
The federal Constitution, in addition to dividing power between the
three branches of government,180 divides power horizontally between
175. McConnell, supra note 120; see also Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 901 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating neutral laws “can
coerce a person to violate his religious conscience or intrude upon his religious
duties . . . .”).
176. See Conroy v. Keith Cty. Bd. of Equalization, 288 Neb. 196, 198, 846 N.W.2d 634,
637 (2014) (“If the meaning is clear, we give a constitutional provision the mean-
ing that laypersons would obviously understand it to convey.”) (citing City of
North Platte v. Tilgner, 282 Neb. 328, 803 N.W.2d 469 (2011)).
177. Hershkoff, supra note 98, at 1166.
178. See Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.W.2d 1039, 1044 (Ohio 2000) (stating “the words of
the Ohio framers do indicate their intent to make an independent statement [in
Ohio’s conscience provision] on the meaning and extent of the freedom” and hold-
ing the Ohio constitution is a document of independent force and grants more
conscience rights to its citizens than the Free Exercise Clause requires).
179. Sanford Levinson, “Reflection and Choice”: A One-Time Experience?, 92 NEB. L.
REV. 239, 244 (2013) (stating the Nebraska constitutional amendment process
allows “ ‘we the people’ [to] become effective policy-makers” and “engage in direct
democracy”). Outside the scope of this Comment is the impact that incorporation
of the Free Exercise Clause against the states has on federalism. For a discussion
on this impact, see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 48.
180. See PAULSEN & PAULSEN, supra note 29, at 30–37. Paulsen & Paulsen also pro-
vide a concise historical discussion regarding separation of powers. Id. at 31 (“[I]t
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the federal and state governments to ensure state autonomy.181 The
people of each state are thus governed both nationally and locally.182
Within this structure, state constitutions are permitted to grant their
citizens more protection than what the federal Constitution affords.183
This is because the federal Constitution acts as a floor, i.e., the “bare
minimum,”184 to the degree of protection state constitutions are re-
quired to provide.185 Therefore, states have the ability to respond to
limitations on rights in the federal Constitution by expanding these
rights within their own state constitutions.186 This enables the Ne-
braska Supreme Court to develop and apply independent jurispru-
dence under its state constitution which heightens individual rights
above the federal Constitution’s floor.187
The Nebraska Supreme Court undermined the distinct roles that
state and federal provisions play within federalism by attaching the
level of protection afforded by the Free Exercise Clause to the Con-
science Clause and removing the horizontal divide between the federal
and state governments’ powers. When the Free Exercise Clause and
Conscience Clause are interpreted congruently, the federal and state
constitutional provisions are no longer treated as different documents
was the framers’ brilliant act of combining the separation of powers with
America’s unique federalism that has proven to be distinctive . . . .”).
181. James Gardner, State Courts as Agents of Federalism: Power and Interpretation
in State Constitutional Law, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1725, 1734 (2003) (citing
U.S. CONST. arts. I–III and amends. X–XI). For additional discussion on the role
of independent state constitutional jurisprudence, see generally James Gray
Pope, An Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 985
(1993).
182. See WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 15 (“[W]e have two kinds of constitutional law in
the United States: federal and state.”) (citations omitted).
183. Rachel A. Van Cleave, State Constitutional Interpretation and Methodology, 28
N.M. L. REV. 199, 202 (1998).
184. Id.
185. Gardner, supra note 65, at 1030.
186. See Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1044–45 (Ohio 2000) (interpreting its
state’s conscience clause as requiring strict scrutiny and stating “[a]s long as
state courts provide at least as much protection as the . . . federal Bill of Rights,
state courts are unrestricted in according greater civil liberties and protections to
individuals and groups”); Gardner, supra note 65, at 1032; see also Thomas
Morawetz, Commentary: Deviation and Autonomy: The Jurisprudence of Inter-
pretation in State Constitutional Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 635, 638 (1994) (“[W]hen
the question is one of conveying a right broader than that granted in the Federal
Constitution, supremacy is irrelevant because federal law is assumed to be
silent.”).
187. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3–24 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing the doctrine of independent and adequate state grounds); see also
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983) (stating federal review of state law
is avoided when the federal courts respect states’ independence). This right is, of
course, subject to the Supremacy Clause. If the state’s interpretation is in con-
flict, it will be subject to United States Supreme Court review under the Federal
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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with separate roles—the federal Constitution operating as a frame-
work, and the Nebraska constitution operating within it and being
permitted to expand its conscience protections further than required
by the federal Constitution.188
As a result, the Conscience Clause is no longer capable of ex-
panding rights beyond what is required under the federal Constitu-
tion. Instead, the Conscience Clause is limited to the “floor” that the
federal Constitution provides. Thus, the Nebraska Supreme Court
continues to disregard the division of power between the state and fed-
eral governments so long as it substitutes the U.S. Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence of a federal provision for independent jurisprudence
under Nebraska’s Conscience Clause.189
Further, state autonomy is harmed when the court refuses to inter-
pret its state constitution independently from the federal Constitu-
tion. Within the horizontal divide of state and federal power, courts
have the ability to develop and apply independent judicial jurispru-
dence apart from the federal government as long as the interpretation
is consistent with the federal Constitution.190 This ability serves a dis-
tinct purpose in the structure of the U.S. constitutional republic. In-
stead of being sub-governmental units, or “mere political
subdivisions”191 of the federal government, states have autonomy to
interpret their state constitutions independently from the federal Con-
stitution.192 In other words, the Nebraska Supreme Court is not
“bound by federal court interpretations of the federal Constitution in
interpreting [its] own Constitution.”193
188. See State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 239 (Wis. 1996) (“[T]he language of the two
[constitutions] is not the same. Some questions cannot be fully illuminated by the
light of federal jurisprudence alone, but may require examination according to
the dictates of the more expansive protections envisioned by our state
constitution.”).
189. PAULSEN & PAULSEN, supra note 29, at 39 (“[T]he framers’ plan was that the
states could have whatever laws they wished for governing their own citizens on
local matters, and the federal government could not interfere.”).
190. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
191. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (“States are not mere politi-
cal subdivisions of the United States.”).
192. Morawetz, supra note 186, at 642 (discussing a historical approach to state con-
stitutional interpretation that promotes state autonomy: “[O]ur separate history
entitles us to read our constitutional provisions in a way that is independent of
the federal reading of federal provisions.”).
193. Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1044–45 (Ohio 2000) (concluding its state
conscience clause permissibly affords greater protection than the Free Exercise
Clause); see also State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 396–97 (Minn. 1990)
(“[T]he Minnesota Constitution alone provides an independent and adequate
state constitutional basis on which to decide [this case].”); TRIBE, supra note 187
(stating the doctrine of independent and adequate state grounds protects states’
right to independently develop state law from interference).
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The court has abandoned the principle of independent constitu-
tional interpretation by declining to interpret the Conscience Clause
on an independent basis from the Free Exercise Clause. When the Ne-
braska Supreme Court does not “accord the . . . textual differences”194
of the state and federal provision any constitutional significance,195
the court is effectively developing dependent constitutional jurispru-
dence. No longer does the Nebraska constitution’s Conscience Clause
serve a distinct interpretive purpose in America’s constitutional re-
public. Instead, the Conscience Clause becomes superfluous; it serves
no separate function from the federal provision because its interpreta-
tion is bootstrapped to the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause.196
State autonomy requires a distinct divide between the federal and
Nebraska Constitutions, and it necessitates independent constitu-
tional jurisprudence. However, the Nebraska Supreme Court refused
to interpret the conscience clause on an independent basis.197 Doing
so violated federalism’s fundamental principles of division of power
and independent interpretation, both of which are built into the
framework of America’s constitutional republic.198
2. Nebraska’s Constitutional Amendment Process
In addition to undermining state autonomy, the court undermines
state sovereignty when it interprets its state provision as the same as
the federal provision. Nebraska’s constitution, unlike the federal Con-
stitution, is ratified and amended by the people of Nebraska.199 Citi-
zens of Nebraska play a critical role in amending the Nebraska
constitution; votes of citizens are involved in every step of the pro-
cess.200 Indeed, the people of Nebraska have a voice in each of the
three ways its constitution can be amended.201
194. In re Interest of Anaya, 276 Neb. 825, 834, 758 N.W.2d 10, 18 (2008).
195. Pope, supra note 181, at 985 (stating judges can look at state constitutional provi-
sions and “build an independent state constitutional jurisprudence around
them”).
196. See SUTTON, supra note 86, at ix (“Why place such pressure on one Court and one
Constitution to referee winner-take-all disputes when the country has fifty-one
high courts and fifty-one constitutions?”).
197. Van Cleave, supra note 183, at 201.
198. Id.
199. GAUL, supra note 24, at 2.
200. See id.
201. Id. (“The Nebraska Constitution can be amended in three ways: via legislative
proposal, a convention, or directly by citizens.”). Legislative proposals must be
submitted to the Nebraska voters, and a majority is required to approve the
amendment. Additionally, the legislature’s recommendation of a constitutional
convention must be approved by the voters. Finally, Nebraskans can petition for
new constitutional amendments via a ballot initiative.
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Nebraska is one of only eighteen states to allow its citizens to pro-
pose constitutional amendments without acquiescence from the legis-
lature.202 This allows Nebraskans to propose constitutional
amendments by engaging in direct democracy via the ballot box.203
Thus, Nebraska’s constitution is the voice of its people. If the people
do not like the language, they may reject it at its proposal or amend
it.204
However, the Nebraska Supreme Court bypassed the crucial role of
citizen involvement when it effectively allowed the Conscience Clause
to be amended through federal judicial interpretation. It was not “We
the People,” but the U.S. Supreme Court, who amended the Con-
science Clause. The Nebraska Supreme Court should not allow federal
Justices to amend the state constitution without the people’s consent.
The people of Nebraska are well-suited to determine the extent of con-
science protections under their state constitution.205 It was with the
people’s voice, through popular vote at the ballot box, that ratified this
language. Rather than taking this into account, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court’s ongoing decision to piggy–back on the federal provi-
sion’s interpretation was a “delegation of hard choices to others.”206
This interpretation supplanted the voice of “We the People” with five,
unelected U.S. Supreme Court Justices.207 The Nebraska Supreme
Court should not delegate the duty of analyzing a constitution’s inde-
pendent history to the U.S. Supreme Court; rather, it should consider
the voice of those who ratified the provision.
Though some argue that judges cannot be expected to develop inde-
pendent judicial jurisprudence for state constitutions because state
constitutions can and do change over time,208 this concern is inappli-
cable to the Conscience Clause. Despite changes to Nebraska’s consti-
tution over time—and the ease of amending Nebraska’s constitution—
the Conscience Clause has remained unchanged since 1875.209 The
202. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 2. Although the constitutional amendment process varies
by state, the majority of state constitutions, unlike Nebraska’s, do not permit
citizens to amend their constitutions through a ballot initiative process. See Lev-
inson, supra note 179.
203. See NEB. CONST. art. III, § 2.
204. See supra text accompanying note 201.
205. WITTE JR., supra note 9, at 76 (“It was commonly assumed at the [1787 Constitu-
tional Convention] that questions of religion and of religious liberty were for the
states and the people to resolve, not the budding federal government.”).
206. Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230,
276 (1994).
207. See PAULSEN & PAULSEN, supra note 29, at 38–39 (“Neither the national govern-
ment nor the state governments would be supreme. Rather, once again, the Con-
stitution would be supreme. . . . Federalism thus furnishes the second half of
James Madison’s ‘double security’ to the liberty of ‘the People.’”).
208. See Pope, supra note 181.
209. See supra text accompanying note 118.
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apprehension of this language changing in the future does not out-
weigh the importance of the Conscience Clause’s language as a reflec-
tion of the voice of the people.
Nebraska has had the same language in its Conscience Clause
since it was ratified. The Clause has retained its language through a
twentieth century constitutional convention and over 230 constitu-
tional amendments.210 Nebraska’s Conscience Clause deserves a
proper interpretation. It should remain the voice of a people who have
recognized the importance of the freedom to live according to the dic-
tates of their conscience for over 140 years.
3. A Second Avenue for Recovery
As a final point, individuals seeking redress from a state law
through the judicial system are better off when state courts interpret
their respective state constitutions independently from the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s interpretation of the federal Constitution.211 This is be-
cause state constitutions provide an additional avenue for plaintiffs to
challenge the validity of a state law.212 This additional opportunity is
not effective if state courts equate their state constitutional provisions
to a federal constitutional provision. Accordingly, state supreme
courts should pursue independent interpretations of their respective
state constitutions for the benefit of their citizenry.
America’s judiciary has developed into a system where federal and
state sovereignties largely overlap.213 Because of this overlap, individ-
uals usually have two separate avenues for recovery.214 Attorneys
have begun to recognize the benefits that alleging distinct state and
federal constitutional violations has on their clients.215 For one, state
constitutions are longer and therefore contain more detail than the
federal Constitution.216 A claimant’s respective state constitution may
210. Levinson, supra note 179, at 244. Because the ability to amend Nebraska’s consti-
tution is easier than most states given the people’s ability to propose amend-
ments via ballot initiative, see supra text accompanying note 201, this statistic in
light of the Conscience Clause’s language remaining the same since 1875 is even
more powerful. In other words, Nebraska’s amendment process is easier than
most states, yet the Conscience Clause has remained untouched.
211. See Jeffrey S. Sutton, Why Teach—and Why Study—State Constitutional Law, 34
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 165, 166, 170–71 (2009) (recognizing that “[w]ith the end of
the Warren Court and the advent of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, commen-
tators (including Justice Brennan) promoted a rebirth of state constitutional
law,” but also noting that “state constitutional law remain[s] an underdeveloped
area of the law”) (citations omitted). E.g., SUTTON, supra note 86, at 16–21.
212. Id. at 8.
213. Id. at 14.
214. Id.
215. See Sutton, supra note 211 at 166, 170–71.
216. See Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts About State Constitutional Interpretation,
115 PENN ST. L. REV. 837, 839 (2011) (“While the federal Constitution comprises
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address her grievance in more specificity than the federal Constitu-
tion. In other words, a state constitution may provide the only way for
a claimant to win with an “on point” provision.217 Second, the “hall-
mark of American constitutionalism”—the division of power between
state and federal government—allows states to develop independent
constitutional law.218
This is a crucial point. When state courts look to the contextual,
cultural, and geographical influences on their respective state consti-
tutions, differences will emerge from the federal Constitution’s inter-
pretation.219 State constitutions thus provide independent avenues of
recovery when they are interpreted according to these differences be-
cause they act as unique shields to individual rights.220 Stated differ-
ently, state constitutions provide “double security” for injured
claimants.221
The Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision to lockstep the Conscience
Clause with the Free Exercise Clause removed the structure of “dual
constitutionalism” from religious liberty jurisprudence in Nebraska.
Not only did the court’s interpretation disregard the specificity that
the Conscience Clause provides; the court’s current application of the
Smith standard to the Conscience Clause prevents plaintiffs in Ne-
braska from having a second avenue of recovery for burdens placed on
their religious exercise and conscience rights. The Nebraska Supreme
Court should seek to afford Nebraskans two, rather than one, opportu-
nities to seek a remedy for conscience rights violations that state and
local laws impose.
IV. CONCLUSION
Freedom of conscience is not only woven into the Nebraska consti-
tution; it is threaded throughout the state’s history since its early
years as a territory. By declining to interpret the Conscience Clause
according to its plain language and by assigning a federal provision’s
meaning to the Conscience Clause, the Nebraska Supreme Court ren-
dered the text, history, and purpose of the clause meaningless. The
court must remedy this violation of the principles of constitutional
a mere 8,700 words, the average length of a state constitution is four times that
. . . .”).
217. See SUTTON, supra note 86, at 19.
218. Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L.
REV. 323, 342 (2011).
219. See SUTTON, supra note 86, at 17; Sutton, supra note 211 at 170–71.
220. See Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature of State Constitution Jurispru-
dence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 435 (1996) (citing Stanley G. Feldman & David L.
Abney, The Double Security of Federalism: Protecting Individual Liberty Under
the Arizona Constitution, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 115, 117 (1988).
221. Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1493 (1987)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51).
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construction.222 Simply put, denying all conscience claims under neu-
tral and generally applicable laws runs contrary to the Conscience
Clause in every aspect.
Further, bootstrapping the Conscience Clause to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause results in a fluctu-
ating meaning of a state provision—a provision that should be rooted
in the principles of federalism and the people’s voice. The Nebraska
Supreme Court engages in judicial overreach when it goes beyond the
unique text of the Conscience Clause—a clause that was crafted and
ratified by the people of Nebraska—to assign this state provision an
interpretation of a federal provision that has a separate and distinct
history and meaning. This overreach has effectively ratified a new
meaning to the Conscience Clause without the People’s consent. It has
resulted in a provision that no longer reflects the beliefs and voice of
the people of Nebraska.
The Nebraska Supreme Court should not shy away from overrul-
ing its decision223 to apply the Smith standard to Nebraska’s Con-
science Clause, just as the court has not shied away from overruling
precedent contrary to basic rules of construction.224 Simply because
the court can assign a meaning to its state constitution does not mean
the court ought to do so.225 Overall, it is time Nebraska citizens be
assured once again that they have the right to live according to the
dictates of their own consciences, just as the Nebraska framers and
early citizens of the State intended.
222. Id.
223. In re Interest of Anaya, 276 Neb. 825, 758 N.W.2d 10 (2008).
224. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., SUTTON, supra note 86, at 19 (“Rational-basis review works for free exer-
cise challenges to neutral, generally applicable laws as a matter of national con-
stitutional law, . . . but the same may not be true for each state constitution.”)
(citations omitted).
